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Carr Goes East: Reconsidering Power and Inequality in a Post-Liberal 
Eurasia 
This paper analyzes Western policies towards Russia from the realist perspective of 
E.H. Carr.  The latter’s critique of inter-war liberal 'utopianism' pointed to – among 
others – the tendency of liberal states to disregard the role of power in shaping an 
international normative order of their making; their discounting of contingency in 
favour of a progressive, teleological view of history; and their insensitivity to the 
structural inequalities reproduced by that order.  These predispositions can also be 
observed in the liberal West's policies towards Russia in the immediate aftermath of the 
end of the Cold War. A teleologically expanding ‘Kantian zone of peace’ centred on 
the EU and NATO – and based on the liberal tripod of institutions, democracy, and free 
trade - became the core of Europe’s de-facto security regime.  Uncovering the power-
political behind the normative, this Carrian perspective subsequently explains the 
gradual deterioration in relations between the West and the Kremlin through the latter’s 
exclusion from institutions shaped at a time of its acute weakness, its inability to 
counter the symbolic power of democracy through political reforms, and its structural 
consignation to the semi-periphery of the globalized economic system. The article 
concludes by proposing a realist alternative for future engagement with Moscow. 
Keywords: Russia; realism; NATO; EU; democracy; E.H. Carr 
Introduction 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, several liberal assumptions took hold of strategic 
policymaking in Western capitals: that international security would now be bolstered through 
an ever-deepening array of laws and institutions; that democracy would inexorably spread 
throughout the world, bringing with it peace and stability; and that free markets, and ensuing 
interdependence, would further contribute to a more peaceful world.  In Europe, the 
expansion of a Kantian ‘zone of peace’ – based on this “liberal tripod” of democracy, 
international institutions and interdependence (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Russett, Oneal, & 
Davis, 1998) – came to be seen as part of the inevitable progression of history. These quasi-
teleological claims became enshrined in the post-Cold War European security order through 
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the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO; the deepening and widening of the continent’s 
human rights regimes; and the predominance of free markets and free trade, both in the 
economic canon of Western policymakers, and the institution-building programmes aimed at 
the former Soviet satellites. 
This system based on a stability borne from international legality, democratic rule, 
and economic interdependence is being challenged today as never before since the end of the 
Cold War: a ‘crisis of liberalism’ – exacerbated by Russia’s great power revisionism – has 
disrupted many of the assumed links between institutions, democracy, interdependence and 
peace underlying the European security order. The upholding of international law by 
institutions like the UN and the OSCE has been confronted by the realities of Russia’s 
conventional and hybrid interventions in Georgia and Ukraine (Allison, 2008, 2014).  
Democratisation in the former Communist bloc has stalled, and, in some cases, seen 
reversals, including within some Central European EU members (Carothers, 2002; Gel'man, 
2006; Rupnik, 2016). Moreover, instead of supporting the existing security order, the 
purported advantages of economic interdependence have translated into a series of 
imbalances and inequalities that have left the European project vulnerable to populist 
challenges, in no small part supported by a Russia unable – or unwilling – to adapt to the 
exigencies of a liberal, globalised world. 
While distinct, the challenges facing Europe’s liberals1 today do show certain 
parallels with those seen during the previous, ill-fated major experiment in ‘idealism’ 
1 Here, ‘liberals’ and ‘liberalism’ refer to a broad ideology emerging from the Western enlightenment, 
combining a belief in free individual reason with a preference for liberal democracy, free 
markets, and international institutions/international law as the foundations of international order.  
These ideas provide the core of the ‘utopianism’ criticised by Carr (2001, pp. 12-41) in his day, 
founded as it was on these three latter principles.  As argued by Ikenberry and others, this 
‘liberalism’ became the bedrock of the post-World War Two order envisaged by the United 
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preceding the Second World War. As during the 1930s, established international legal 
frameworks are being tested by an authoritarian, revisionist state through threats to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of newly independent, relatively powerless European 
states. Feeding off the imbalances in the liberal order, an ‘illiberal international’ is 
challenging fundamental values throughout Europe and beyond. Liberal states are confronted 
with a choice between upholding an established order – and risking all-out conflict – or 
allowing the challenge to stand, all the while seeing their own democracies challenged by a 
populist, anti-liberal wave. Parallels between the interbellum’s ‘twenty-years’ crisis’ of 
liberalism and its contemporary equivalent therefore abound. 
Comparisons to the interbellum have become something of a ritual in recent decades: 
appeals to Munich, 1938 were, for instance, previously applied equally disparately to Iraq 
(Record, 2007), Kosovo (Paris, 2002), Iran (McCann, 2015), Syria (Dyer, 2016), and have 
now been reproduced in Ukraine by those advocating greater intervention (Traynor and 
MacAskill, 2014).  These rhetorical exercises are usually applied in defence of the existing 
liberal order, obscuring the many taken-for-granted assumptions that have left this order 
vulnerable to decay and attack in the first place. In other words, the interbellum has become a 
cautionary tale providing arguments for forceful intervention in defence of liberalism, while 
leaving the weaknesses and blind spots that left the liberal order prone to destabilisation in 
the first place unquestioned.   
In fact, rather than a straightforward admonition against appeasement, the inter-war 
years provide a much more nuanced narrative, in the person and thought of one of the rare 
realists of that particular era: E.H. Carr (2001, originally published in 1939).  Carr’s ‘Twenty 
Years Crisis’ remains a classic of the International Relations canon; the work – and the 
States, and provided the Kantian normative core within the broader European project – largely 
confined in the non-Communist West during the Cold War (Ikenberry, 2009, 2012; Manners, 
2008).   
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reactions it provoked – emerged at a time when a declining, broadly liberal international 
order was successfully being challenged by revisionist authoritarian powers.  His critical 
brand of realism was aimed at uncovering the unequal power relations hiding behind moral 
and legal arguments of the liberals – or, as he somewhat polemically called them, ‘utopians’ 
– of his time.  Carr railed against Versailles, and the ways in which the unequal power 
relations inherent to the inter-war European legal order were all too often cloaked in the 
language of moral superiority (pp. 172-174); he reminded his readers how, absent a 
sovereign, international laws and institutions were more often than not shaped according to 
the interests of the powerful, or, more concretely in his times, the victors of World War One, 
and how the breakdown of that system was a result of its inability to accommodate a 
humiliated and side-lined Germany, even under the liberal Weimar republic.  Moreover, he 
attacked the liberal assumption of an alignment of interest among states and societies around 
free trade, which he saw as a crucial blind spot leading to dangerous inequalities, of which 
conflict and authoritarianism could freely feed (pp. 207-208).  These arguments still stand as 
a major reminder of liberals’ tendency to let claims to the international moral high ground 
distort their perceptions of a fundamental political reality: the entanglement of power with an 
international moral or legal order that might emerge during any given period of history.   
In what comes below, I shall critically employ Carr’s realist perspective to juxtapose 
the liberal claims inherent to Western policymaking in post-Cold War Eurasia with the – 
often overlooked – unequal relations of power enabling them.  A first section will explore 
E.H. Carr’s ideas on the liberal distortions and misperceptions of his age and argue for their 
applicability in the present.  The next section will then examine the role of these liberal 
assumptions in the emergence of Europe’s post-Cold War security order, based as it was on 
an ever-expanding Kantian zone of peace centred on NATO and the EU into what, because of 
Russia’s relative impotence, had become a geopolitical vacuum.  Despite liberal claims to the 
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contrary, power and geopolitics influenced the new order in manifold ways. On the one hand, 
its emergence was predicated on a particularly favourable balance-of-power. On the other 
hand, far from being purely moral givens, its taken-for-granted norms – democracy and the 
free market – then tilted that balance in the West’s favour in a quasi-permanent manner, 
leaving a marginalised Russia to challenge it with ‘hard’ and ‘hybrid’ forms of power.  The 
paper will conclude prescriptively, by positing a number of recommendations for Western 
policymaking based on Carr’s ideas. It will point to the need for a revalidation of the realities 
of the power-political in policymaking through a reinforcement of the established EU/NATO-
centred liberal ‘core’, combined with a new, ‘thinner’ legal and political order that 
acknowledges the more power-political nature of interaction in a largely post-liberal twenty-
first century Eurasia. 
E.H. Carr: From Inter-War Idealism to post-Cold War Liberalism 
E.H. Carr is identified as one of the founders of the realist tradition in International Relations; 
and while his concern with power as the determining element in international relations indeed 
puts him firmly within that paradigm, it is all too often forgotten that his most important work 
– the ‘Twenty Years Crisis’ (2001) – emerged from a truth-to-power critique of idealism 
rooted as much in the traditions of Horkheimer and Gramsci, as those of Hobbes and 
Machiavelli.  For Carr, the analysis of international politics from the perspective of power 
was not something done for its own purpose. His goal was to enable a politics that would be 
able to accommodate peaceful change by uncovering the real drivers of international politics 
– power and interest – behind claims to moral superiority.  In an anarchic world, the realities 
of power could not be circumvented through law and institutions, and policymakers would, in 
the first instance, have to always keep an eye on these realities, at the risk of leading their 
states into unnecessary wars.   
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If Carr was a realist, he certainly was one with a strong critical slant, seeing the 
uncovering of unequal power relations behind claims to moral and legal superiority as an 
essential element in maintaining the peace (Cox, 1981; Howe, 1994; Linklater, 2001).  And 
he lived at a time when such claims to superiority abounded, at least in those states that had 
not fallen prey to the totalitarian and authoritarian tendencies of the decade preceding the 
publication of the Twenty Years’ Crisis.  The League of Nations may have been utterly 
ineffective in practice; in theory, it nevertheless remained the focus of morality and legality 
for the ‘well-thinking’ section of the international community.  By the 1930s, the oppressive 
nature of Versailles may have been acknowledged by many; others nevertheless clung to its 
precepts in the name of retributive justice, or, simply, out of policy inertia (Carr, 2001, p. 
201).  And many of the newer states in Central and Eastern Europe – including those at the 
centre of the systemic crisis, Czechoslovakia and Poland – at least partly owed their existence 
to Woodrow Wilson’s dogged adherence to the liberal principle of self-determination (p. 46). 
The problem, according to Carr, lay in the fact that the inter-war arrangement had 
been designed by the victors, whose moralistic language on ‘international law’ and ‘peace’ 
hid a largely self-interested effort aimed at maintaining the post-War status quo, and their 
superior position within it.  In Carr’s words: 
Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its 
own security and predominance, and denounces class war, which might threaten them, so 
international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant Powers.  In the past, 
Roman and British imperialism were commended to the world in the guise of the pax 
Romana and the pax Britannica.  To-day, when no single power is strong enough to 
dominate the world, and supremacy is vested in a group of nations, slogans like 
‘collective security’ and ‘resistance to aggression’ serve the same purpose of proclaiming 
an identity of interest between the dominant group and the world as a whole in the 
maintenance of peace (p. 76). 
Versailles – a ‘diktat’ signed ‘under duress’ (pp. 172-3) – was thus not so much an effort at 
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‘justice’ as an attempt to prime the European balance of power against a German resurgence 
(p. 142); and, for all its ineffectiveness – mostly blamed on the illusory nature of the 
alignment of interests around international peace – the League of Nations system served to 
fortify the status-quo with misguided appeals to the moral power of ‘international public 
opinion’ (pp. 125-6).  Carr similarly rejected the universal applicability of liberal democracy, 
arguing that its imposition on ‘countries whose stage of development and practical needs 
were utterly different from those of Western Europe’ inevitably resulted in ‘sterility and 
disillusionment’ (p. 29).  Wedded to this vision was Carr’s overall rejection of the principles 
of free trade in the international political economy as, once again, an instrument of the 
economically dominant and industrialised against the weak and underdeveloped (Carr, 1948, 
p. 18; 2001, pp. 42-61).  Self-interest became cloaked in a language of morality and legality, 
of commonality of interest, which, far from being a cynical legitimising device, was actually 
believed by many of the idealist promoters of these policies: interest and power thus shaped 
law and morality surreptitiously, in a fortuitous coincidence unremarked by the liberals 
themselves.  
Carr criticised the tendency of ‘utopians’ to think in moral absolutes and forget the 
historically contingent nature of all human thought. For Carr, ‘the morality of a dominant 
group [was] always distorted by the perspective of its self-interest, and it [identified] that 
interest with absolute and universal good’ (Carr, 1948, p. 17).  Omniscience was, moreover, 
‘unattainable because thought is always in some degree conditioned by historical 
circumstance…Yet he [Carr] observed in political and intellectual leaders, and indeed in 
society at large, the disturbing tendency to extrapolate beyond their ken, to make spurious 
claims of universal legitimacy’  (Howe, 1994, pp. 279-280).  With ‘every working concept of 
morality…tainted with power’ (Carr, 1948, p. 16), the alternative to accepting peaceful 
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international change was therefore often waging unnecessary wars justified in terms of moral 
absolutes.   
Instead, he proposed a ‘longue durée’ view of ideas and concepts, and a pragmatic, 
materially and historically grounded approach to international politics, one that moved as 
circumstances changed. It was, indeed, realism’s open-ended nature, and its sense of 
historical and material proportion that endowed it with a measure of intellectual humility and 
openness (Carr, 2001, pp. 62-65).   Pragmatic unpretentiousness trumped ideological 
assertiveness as the guiding principle of statecraft, because ‘readiness to fight to prevent 
change [was] just as unmoral as readiness to fight to enforce it.  To establish methods of 
peaceful change [was] therefore the fundamental problem of international morality and of 
international politics’ (pp. 201-202).  
These arguments are often forgotten when interventionist liberals refer to Munich, 
1938, or the rise of fascism as the only major lessons of the inter-war period for the second 
decade of the twenty-first century.  For Carr, Chamberlain’s failed attempts at maintaining 
peace in his time were only part of the story leading up to World War Two: the 
counterproductive nature of many liberal assumptions and a constant disregard for the 
shifting sands of power were also factors that set the scene for Hitler’s rise to power and 
Europe’s road towards conflagration.  Maintaining the ultimately paralysing myth of a 
morally superior ‘commonality of interest’ in the League of Nations was instrumental in this 
lead-up to World War Two; the uncritical adherence of many liberals to the status-quo of 
Versailles underlay the German turn towards cynical power-politics once its capabilities had 
been restored (p. 201); and a similarly distorted belief in laissez-faire –‘the paradise of the 
economically strong’ (p. 57) – had obscured the inequities that eventually resulted in the rise 
of economic nationalism. 
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There are, of course, considerable differences between the post-World War One and 
post-Cold War European arrangements.  For one, absent anything resembling the European 
Union, the Europe of the 1920s and 1930s was still very much one of nation-states; there was 
nothing comparable to NATO, no security mechanisms similar to the OSCE’s, or 
comprehensive human rights regimes akin to the Council of Europe’s.  In this era of 
totalitarianism, the continent was moreover far less uniformly democratic; and no-one is 
today subjected to the kind of reparations imposed by Versailles on Germany.  The values 
driving the inter-war idealists were, nevertheless, identifiably similar to those underwriting 
today’s far more densely institutionalised liberal European order. The underlying idea is that 
accountable government, international law and institutions, and free trade – three elements 
that Russett and Oneal (2001; 1998) have referred to as the ‘tripod of the liberal peace’ – can 
overcome the power politics of the past.  These principles have indeed been realised to a far 
greater degree in the present than in the 1930s. This does not mean, however, that they have 
moved beyond the vulnerabilities identified by Carr in his time, especially those emerging 
from a disregard for the complex nexus tying liberal international order to power, inequality 
and self-interest. 
A commonality of interest between the West and Russia around a broader liberal 
normative framework was, for a long time, assumed a priori, based in no small part on the 
belief that liberalism was ‘the only game in town’ following the end of the Cold War. The 
teleological assumption that, absent a rational alternative, the states of the former Soviet 
Union – including Russia – would move towards a liberal model, was predicted by the 
multiple versions of transition theory in vogue at the time.  As a result, Western 
policymakers nonchalantly underestimated the extent to which this broader normative order 
was based on the contingencies of the moment. As pointed out by Carr, a realist 
understanding of politics would have been acutely aware of the temporally limited nature of 
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utopian systems of thought and the dependence of their realisation on a favourable balance of 
power.  In fact, liberals’ belief in the moral superiority of democracy and democratisation 
ended up obscuring their roles in exacerbating the very real power differentials between 
themselves and those powers less prone to democratising, leading the latter to use hard and 
hybrid power tools in an effort to compensate. Quite paradoxically, this turned 
democratisation into an object of geopolitics rather than a harbinger of a Kantian peace. 
The international legal and institutional framework emerging from liberalism’s 
perceived Cold War victory was thus based on an underestimation of the enabling role of 
power, in favour of a sense of historical, moral, and rational, inevitability on the part of much 
of the West’s overwhelmingly liberal policymaking community.  The idea that European 
security required the eastward expansion of the Kantian zone of peace represented by NATO 
and the EU downplayed the very differently defined national interests of a weakened Russia.  
In fact, as will be argued in the following sections, the ‘democracy’ norm condemned a 
Russia that was unable to adapt to lower status, something anathema to its long-term self-
perception as a great power.  Similarly, liberals’ blindness to the unequal impacts of a laissez-
faire economics – extensively critiqued by Carr in his time – led them to underestimate the 
severe impact of their reforms on the Russian population, which, in turn, discredited the 
liberal project within Russia and condemned the erstwhile superpower to the status of what 
Morozov has referred to as a ‘subaltern empire’ in the semi-periphery of the global economic 
system.  It is to these themes – the power-political implications of institutions, democracy 
and the free market – that the next section will turn. 
Institutions, Democratisation and Free Markets as Power 
Liberal perceptions on Europe’s legal and institutional architecture found their origins in the 
nature of the Soviet Union’s retreat from its former sphere of influence in Central and Eastern 
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Europe. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and, subsequently, the Soviet system, an 
ideological and institutional void opened up between NATO and the former Soviet Union.  In 
the 1990s and early 2000s, the relative ease with which the former then expanded into that 
void, and the weakness of a crisis-prone USSR and Russia gave power-politics a far smaller 
role in Western policymakers’ discourses than an openly proclaimed mission to remake the 
world. ‘End of History’s’ promise gave the impression that a common-sense consensus on 
liberal international institutions – constructed around the norms of democracy and the free 
market – would underlie the brave new world.  But a commonality of interest around such a 
norms-based order was, more often than not, assumed – an assumption that became more 
difficult to maintain when the liberal project entered into conflict with Moscow and its very 
different, power-political view of international affairs. 
Democracy and free markets became the ideological cornerstones of Western policy 
towards the ‘New Europe’.  Liberal claims in the academe were reflected, however 
imperfectly, and in admittedly simplified form, in a policymaking orthodoxy: promoting the 
spread of democracy and the market became an explicit – and sometimes pervasive – part of 
subsequent American (and other Western) National Security Concepts and policy documents 
(see, e.g. European Union, 2003; USA, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2015).  The oft-
expressed expectation was that, with the gradual spread of democracy and trade, Europe 
would finally be able to lay aside the complications of its past, as its nation-states became 
subsumed into a community of prosperous democratic states. In the words of then US 
president Clinton (1994): 
[Liberalism sought] to increase the security of all, to erase the old lines without drawing 
arbitrary new ones, to bolster emerging democracies, and to integrate the nations of 
Europe into a continent where democracy and free markets know no borders but where 
every nation's borders are secure. 
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This democratising and liberalising agenda came to be inextricably linked with the emerging 
institutional infrastructure on the continent, again based on an inherently liberal logic: 
organisations which, during the Cold War, had been set up to monitor, uphold, or promote 
human rights – like the Council of Europe and the OSCE – came to include mechanisms 
aimed at democracy-promotion within a growing number of members and candidate 
members (Glover, 1995; Zielonka and Pravda, 2001). But more significantly, the core of 
Europe’s de-facto security regime came to be based on the ‘prefab multilateralism’ (Sarotte, 
2011) provided by NATO and the European Union, with democratisation and economic 
liberalisation among the central ideological requirements for membership. Existing Western 
institutional arrangements were simply expanded eastwards, imposed ‘as is’, creating what 
Sakwa (2017, p. 412) has referred to as a ‘monological trap’, a logic that was both path-
dependent and devoid of self-critique.   
And yet, contrary to what was often claimed, all three legs of this liberal tripod had 
clear power-political implications.  This was perhaps most obviously the case for the first, 
institutional leg, founded on NATO. Remarkably, however, these power-political 
implications were systematically denied and obfuscated as the Alliance expanded eastward.  
Less obvious but equally important were the power-political implications of the more 
normative elements of democracy and the free market. In fact, in their very specific ways, 
they were both enabled by an overwhelming dominance of the West, while at the same time 
reinforcing the West’s hegemony over the rules of the game governing the continent. Let’s 
take a closer look at each of the three legs of this liberal project in turn.  
Ignoring the Power-Political 1: Institutions 
Western liberals were, at first, conscious of Russian objections to NATO expansion, 
and therefore proceeded carefully in the early 1990s. But as the decade progressed and the 
issue found its place firmly on the West’s agenda, any Russian protestations were usually 
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dismissed or minimised by rationalising them within the framework of a simplistic 
dichotomy between Yeltsin’s reformers on the one hand, and nationalist or conservative 
‘reactionary forces’ on the other (Talbott, 2002: 217-250; Federal News Service, 1997a).  
These assumptions persisted long after Russia’s own liberal moment – in the early 1990s – 
had passed, unable to re-define the country’s foreign and security interests away from the 
realist templates held by the vast majority of its foreign policy establishment (Blank, 2010, p. 
37; Dannreuther, 1999; Williams and Neumann, 2000, p. 359).  Russia’s acute weakness and 
personalised policymaking centred on the increasingly erratic Boris Yeltsin allowed the West 
to disregard this fact, at least for a while. Concessions were pushed through based on the 
assumption that, over the longer term, Russia’s president would be able to ‘sell’ them or 
impose them onto the other parts of Russia’s state machinery, who would just have to accept 
the emergent situation.  This was neither an arrangement based on attitudinal change, or one 
that left the vast majority of Russians – whether in the elite or outside of it – seeing 
themselves as having a stake in a genuinely inclusive security system, incidentally much like 
large swathes of the German elite and population during the inter-war years. 
Russia’s input in this emerging security architecture in the 1990s was, thus, at best 
reactive and peripheral. In spite of all – mostly symbolic – ‘consultative’ add-ons, the 
NATO/EU-based Kantian security order had presented Russia with a fait accompli.  Several 
developments then made the resulting order untenable in Russia’s eyes. First, with the 
Kosovo intervention, the extent to which the Kremlin had found itself marginalised in 
Europe’s security architecture ‘hit home’ in Moscow (Antonenko, 2007; Averre, 2009).  
While this initially led to a cautious foreign policy and some pragmatic co-operation with the 
West, Russia’s economic and military revival under Putin (more on which below) eventually 
enabled the aggrieved and far from converted foreign policy establishment to push back with 
an alternative security project. Moreover, Western encroachment into the former Soviet 
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Union – into which both NATO and the EU started expanding their democratising and 
liberalising logics from the early-mid 2000s – heightened the urgency for a response 
(Mankoff, 2007).  And indeed, when, with the colour revolutions, NATO and the EU seemed 
poised to expand this security system towards what Russia still perceived as its ‘sphere of 
privileged interest’ (Trenin, 2009), relations between Moscow and Western capitals 
deteriorated rapidly.  
Putin’s Munich speech (2007) was perhaps the watershed moment in Russia’s move 
away from attempts to reconcile itself with the Western-dominated post-Cold War order. 
Liberal surprise at this seemingly sudden rejection of the status-quo conveniently papered 
over many of the long-standing assumptions that underlay Europe’s post-Cold War 
arrangement, assumptions that had emerged during the triumphalist early 1990s, and had, by 
the end of the decade, culminated in the oft-expressed idea that the Alliance’s eastward 
expansion was ‘in Russia’s own interest’ (Federal News Service, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 
1998). Enabled by the relative ease with which the West expanded into the political vacuum 
that Central and Eastern Europe had become in the aftermath of 1989, the illusion of a 
shared, rational interest in the seamless functioning of the institutional order had persisted as 
NATO expanded into the former Soviet Union, and even – as evidenced in the reactions to 
Putin’s Munich outburst – in the face of explicit Russian assertions to the contrary. 
Thus, according to one senior US official, Russia had to ‘understand that NATO is 
not and has not been, for the history -- for the many years since 1989, '90 and '01, directed at 
all against Russia, but is the one uniquely unifying force for peace and stability in Europe 
itself’ (Federal News Service, 2007).  German officials stressed how ‘both sides need each 
other’, obviating the need for a ‘second Cold War’, pointing to the partnership between 
Russia and NATO, and dismissing Putin’s speech as ‘macho talk’ (BBC Monitoring, 2007a) 
or posturing characteristic of former spies (Deutsche Presse Agentur, 2007).  An American 
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senator perhaps provided the clearest example of the amalgamation of universal Kantian 
normativity with geopolitics: for Lieberman, Putin’s assertion that there was ‘one single 
center of power-in the world’ was ‘correct. But that power [was] not the United States. It 
[was] the power of freedom’ (States News Service, 2007).  The general theme of previous 
years – that there was no fundamental conflict of interest between a benign, democratising 
NATO, and Russia – was maintained, while the overwhelmingly positive response to the 
speech in Russia’s elite was ignored (BBC Monitoring, 2007b; Russia & CIS General 
Newswire, 2007a, 2007b). 
This disjuncture between the realities of power and ideologically conditioned 
perceptions had been a major factor in Carr’s critique of the ‘utopian’ inter-war years, when, 
similarly, liberals assumed that Weimar Germany’s submission to the Versailles system had 
been the result of a reasonable adaptation to a new world order, and its corollary of a 
fundamental ‘harmony of interests’ between states.  Carr’s dismissal of the liberal assumption 
that rational states and statesmen are interested in peace at all times and at any cost stood at 
the centre of his critique of the utopian order of his time. His warning that only those who 
had actively shaped a given institutional and legal framework had an active interest in the 
peaceful order it produced appeared to have been forgotten, leading to all kinds of 
assumptions and misperceptions of Moscow’s intentions, not least the assumption that 
Russia’s objections to NATO enlargement could be dismissed as ‘unreasonable’, and 
therefore largely ignored as irrelevant, much like a weak Weimar Germany’s objections to 
Versailles had been ignored in Carr’s times. 
Ignoring the Power-Political 2: Democratisation 
In the years following the first major expression of the breakdown in Russian-Western 
relations – the 2008 Russo-Georgian War (Cheterian, 2010; Cornell and Starr, 2009; 
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Kakachia, 2009) – the role of NATO diminished in favour of the European Union. Alliance 
expansion into the former Soviet Union was put on the back burner and Brussels’ European 
Neighbourhood Policy was upgraded to its Eastern Partnership.  The oft-expressed 
expectation was that the resulting normative expansion of the democratic and commercial 
peace could not possibly be objected to by Moscow as the extension of a geopolitical ‘sphere 
of influence’. Surely, sovereign states should be able to choose political-legal models and 
economic ties at will, and such free choice did not constitute geopolitics-as-usual?   
At least, this was the idea repeatedly echoed by European policymakers at the time. In 
the words of EU Commission President Barroso, ‘the time of spheres of interest in Europe 
was over ... All the countries in Europe are free to choose where they want to be and with 
whom they want to work’ (Deutsche Presse Agentur, 2009). These sentiments were echoed in 
numerous speeches, among others by Germany’s and Poland’s foreign ministers (BBC 
Monitoring, 2009; States News Service, 2009).  For Štefan Füle (2013), then European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, ‘Russia [would] also benefit 
greatly from the integration of the Eastern Partnership countries into the wider European 
economy’, while those calling on him to engage in ‘strategic games’ had to be rejected. His 
business was not engaging in ‘zero-sum games’ but in ‘promoting the [EU] values more 
robustly’, as he was ‘a believer in win-win games, particularly in dealing with such a 
strategic partner as Russia’. Such sentiments – denying the geopolitical natures of both 
NATO and the EU – were also frequently expressed by US officials (e.g. Federal News 
Service, 2009, 2010). 
To the surprise – and frustration – of many (e.g. Bildt, 2015, pp. 9-11; Füle, 2014), 
Russia maintained its objections even to these purely normative and economic forays, setting 
up the Eurasian Economic Union as an alternative and actively thwarting EU-Europe’s 
efforts at integrating its ‘Eastern neighbourhood’, eventually leading to the ongoing conflict 
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in Ukraine.  The problem was that, in their views of both the European Union, and – arguably 
to a lesser extent – NATO, Western policymakers remained guided by the same liberal logics 
that denied the power-political implications of their normative project.  Thus, while 
remaining true to one of their organisation’s fundamental values – the denial of power-
politics – EU policymakers appeared oblivious to the very geopolitical implications of the 
civilian modernising-cum-pacifying project they were promoting.  As norms undergirding a 
very specific – liberal - status-quo, ‘democracy’ and ‘free markets’ had important power-
political consequences that remained often overlooked by their Western proponents.  Viewed 
from a critical Carrian perspective, their promotion was not based on a selfless adherence to a 
higher morality; instead, they had subtle but significant power-political implications, as 
explained below.  
Carr himself rejected the positive-sum rationality often attributed by liberals to free 
trade, arguing that they more often than not skewed the field in favour of established 
industrial powers.  Systematic critiques of the ‘democratic peace’ were largely absent in 
Carr’s work, but a similar rejection of a commonality of interest in the pacifying virtues of 
democratisation could be made based on a similar logic: namely, that democracy as a norm 
gives a subtle, but quite relevant power-political advantage to mature democracies, or states 
able to rapidly democratise.  Indeed, for Carr, ‘power in international politics [was] 
commonly thought of as a bludgeon working by methods of compulsion or oppression; the 
better analogy [was] sometimes a magnet working by involuntary attraction’ (Carr, 1948, p. 
16). And these powers of ‘involuntary attraction’ were at work in both the political and 
economic aspects of the West’s interaction with the former Soviet space.  The subtly, but 
significant power-political aspects of democracy and free markets were of direct consequence 
to Russia, which was unable – for a number of reasons – to either develop a mature 
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democracy, or transition to a competitive free market, with detrimental consequences for its 
position within the resulting order.   
Liberal assumptions on the democratic peace and democracy as a shared interest 
ignored the very different Russian perspectives on these two issues.  An academic 
questioning of the democratic peace became a recurring feature of Russian scholarship, and 
part and parcel of the basic world-view of its elites, where this typically liberal notion had 
gained very little traction in any case (see Izgarskaya, 2008; Salikov, 2012, 2013; Tsygankov, 
2005).  More than that, however, rather than it being a matter of scepticism towards the 
various claims of the ‘democratic peace’ (a scepticism which also emerged in Western 
scholarship; see, e.g., Henderson, 2002; Layne, 1994; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Zakaria, 
1997), Russia’s eventual rejection of the ‘democratisation’ norm – after futile attempts to 
conform to it in the 1990 – was amplified by democracy’s power-political implications, 
implications that liberals tended to ignore.  In fact, the democratisation requirement 
established a normative hierarchy distinguishing strongly between fully, semi- and non-
democratic states in the Western reaches of Eurasia. Ostracism resulted from an inability or 
unwillingness – as in Russia’s case – to move up that ladder.2  This had serious consequences 
for Russia. Its failure to democratise put it at a power-political disadvantage in an ever-subtle 
2 This power-political aspect of ‘democratisation has been captured in critical German research 
programme on the ‘democratic peace’, which examines the exclusionary and hierarchical 
practices inherent in its distinction between ‘democracies’ and ‘non-democracies’. According to 
Geis (2006, p. 142), ‘the scientific debate on democratic peace […] obscures all the exclusionary 
political discourses and practices that are not in accordance with the positive self-image of 
democracies’.  In a Bourdieusian vein, Goetze (2006) moreover describes how liberal 
democracy has helped maintain a highly stratified international political field, where a select 
group of mature democratic – but also wealthy, and militarily powerful – states dominate, 
holding a monopoly of access to economic and social capital, and, therefore, both material and 
symbolic power.  Viewed from that perspective, the liberal idea that democratisation is merely 
normative, divorced from the power- and geo-political becomes much less tenable. 
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way, by condemning it to, at most, a semi-peripheral status. Democracy held powers of 
attraction, and, from that perspective, was a very relevant, geopolitical factor, without which 
Russia could simply not compete on an equal footing, especially in the post-Cold War 
European context. 
The implication of the above is that the liberal assumption of a shared rational interest 
in ‘democratisation’ thus under-estimates the extent to which the interest in democracy 
displayed by those outside the small group of mature democracies was dependent upon the 
contingent confluence of norms and power in the immediate post-Cold War years, and the 
inherent attractions of ‘democracy’ in the form of the social capital and symbolic power it 
accorded the ‘democratic community of states’.   States and societies gravitated towards 
democratic forms of government not simply because they saw it as inherently good, but also 
because – as in the case of Eastern European states – it granted them membership and the 
protection of a security community centred on a powerful elite.3 For those countries unable or 
unwilling to democratise – like Russia – democratic forms of government became a source of 
diminished prestige, a lack of symbolic power with significant consequences for the always 
power-conscious Russians, and their ability to compete with this democratic elite in what 
they still saw as a zero-sum world. 
Ignoring the Power-Political 3: Free Markets 
As in Carr’s times, liberals were thus over-estimating the uniform acceptance of universal 
values and interests, whether in the case of the institutions that emerged in post-Cold War 
3 Thus, ‘the nascent identity of the liberal democratic Czech Republic was as much sustained through 
the narrative of the Czech ‘‘Return to [democratic] Europe’’, as it was through the ‘‘othering’’ 
against both the communist totalitarian past and the present of inimical Russia’ (Kratochvíl, 
Cibulková, & Beneš, 2006, p. 502).  Comparative quantitative studies in Central and Eastern 
Europe also found a correlation between a fear of Russia and support for Westward integration, 
including the attendant reforms (Kostadinova, 2000).  
20 
 
                                                 
Europe, or of Western liberal democracy or democratisation.  But liberals had an additional 
blind spot identified by Carr: one related to their ideology’s inherent inequalities and 
contradictions, especially when it came to the free market’s effects on states and populations 
outside the core of industrialised capitalism.  As Russia went through a decade of socio-
economic hardship punctuated by kleptocracy and saw its economy marginalised into, at 
most, the semi-periphery of globalised capitalism, liberals remained surprisingly oblivious to 
the very different interpretations of the neoliberal laissez-faire economy among Russia’s 
elites and its population.  Liberalism’s inherently positive-sum view of the free market 
contrasted sharply with the Russian zero-sum experience of socio-economic dislocation and 
structural disadvantage, a difference in perspectives captured by Carr’s critique of his 
‘utopian’ contemporaries decades beforehand. 
Russia’s economic revival immediately following the turbulent 1990s – which 
ordinary Russians perceived through the lens of economic shock and ‘prikhvatizatsiya’4 – 
was based mainly on a recovery in the price of the natural resources that still lay at the centre 
of an uncompetitive economy.  The Kremlin was, however, soon confronted with the limits 
set by the Russian economy’s lack of competitiveness, and the limited attraction an energy-
based rentier economy could hold in the so-called ‘near abroad’, certainly when compared 
with the developed economies of the West (Gustafson, 2012; Hashim, 2010; Kirkham, 2016).  
Subsequent efforts at developing and rebalancing the economy were, primarily, about 
addressing these deficits in economic forms of power in ways compatible with both the 
hegemonic liberal environment, and a set of inherently power-political objectives – military 
reform, continued preponderance within the former Soviet space - which had been fairly 
4  A sarcastic neologism constructed through a combination of the Russian words for ‘grab’ and 
‘privatisation’ (see Andreff, 2003, pp. 50-52). 
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constant since the end of the brief liberal foreign policy experiment of the early 1990s (see 
Kremlin.ru, 2009).  
In the end, Russia’s efforts at modernisation remained a very partial and superficial 
affair. Except for a few successes within the defence industry, the many attempts to address 
the continued dependence on natural resources– especially during the Medvedev ‘interlude’ 
between 2008 and 2012 – failed to overcome substantial structural impediments (Guriev and 
Zhuravskaya, 2010; Rutland, 2013). This prompted some analysts to relegate economic 
reforms to the realm of ‘science fiction’ (Pynnöniemi, 2014) or dismiss them as ‘Potemkin 
modernisation’ (Shevtsova, 2010).   
Failed reform condemned Russia to remain outside the core of advanced nations in 
the economic as well as the political sense: an unacceptable position for any state as wedded 
to great power status as Russia. Economic realities have confined Russia to the status of what 
Morozov (2013, 2015) has referred to as a ‘subaltern empire’: an entity which remains a great 
power by virtue of its sheer geo-strategic bulk, but stays firmly excluded from the core of the 
global capitalist system, and, therefore, is less attractive as an alternative power pole in 
international affairs.  Russia lacks both broad-spectrum economic and normative power, and 
its elites remain painfully aware of that fact, especially as an increasing number of former 
satellites have ‘defected’ to the much more powerful – in the multi-dimensional sense of the 
word – West, whether by aspiring to NATO membership, or by engaging with the EU’s 
‘Eastern Partnership’ (Kubicek, 2009; Molchanov, 2016; Trenin, 2002). 
All of this set the stage for the turbulent relations between the West and Russia 
following Putin’s 2007 outburst in Munich. Unable to reform its economy and political 
system in ways that would counteract the attractiveness of the West through its own ‘powers 
of attraction’, Russia had to rely on its hard power capabilities to redress this imbalance, 
using economic blackmail and ‘hybrid’ military power to achieve its objectives in Georgia, 
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Armenia, Ukraine and elsewhere (Götz, 2016; Shirinyan and Ralchev, 2013; Wilson, 2014).  
Moscow’s interests hadn’t changed: in fact, they had been fairly constant since the end to the 
brief liberal experiment in the early 1990s.  What had changed was its ability to counteract 
the perceived encroachment on those interests by the West.  That these developments led to 
charges of their leaders ‘living in another world’ (Traynor and Wintour, 2014), or behaving 
‘in nineteenth-century fashion’ (Dunham, 2014) was not surprising in light of the liberal 
status-quo assumptions on the validity of existing norms, institutions, and economic relations, 
and the Western idea that these were perceived as a positive-sum game by all involved. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the West had, in fact, unlearned the harsher logics of geopolitics 
through a taken-for-granted order shaped by itself. But this order was never accepted by the 
Kremlin, either during the Yeltsin or the Putin years.  Its earlier attempts to engage with 
Western institutions notwithstanding, the Kremlin had always been, at its heart, a hotbed of 
realist power-politics. That this was felt like a ‘different world’ to the liberal West is far from 
surprising.  
This returns our discussion to E.H. Carr’s treatment of a previous group of ‘utopian’ 
liberals, and their insensitivity to the realities of power and the historically contingent nature 
of knowledge, in light of their privileged position in an international political and economic 
system shaped mainly by themselves.  Carr warned of the free market and laissez-faire 
economics as one of liberalism’s important blind spots. Far from being a system which 
guaranteed gains for all, it in effect privileged those at the core of any resulting political 
economy.  The Russian case is no different: post-Cold War liberals expected the Russian 
elite’s rationalism to conform to their own order, blinded by the historically conditioned 
structural advantages – both in terms of political, economic and ‘soft’ forms of power – 
granted them by their position within the OECD ‘elite’ of globalisation.  Without this 
privilege, the Kremlin remained acutely aware of the relevance of power to the political 
23 
 
processes of the liberal age; once these processes started encroaching on its core interests – 
which had remained fairly constant throughout – conflicts were the inevitable result.   
Conclusion: Revalidating Realism in the Wider Europe 
Applied to the present, Carr’s critical version of realism reveals the extent to which liberal 
assumptions time and again distort and disguise the role of power in shaping the laws and 
institutions, political norms, and economic structures whose legitimacy and equity are so 
often taken for granted.  In that sense, the period following the end of the Cold War presents 
a repetition of history, exposing what appears to be a number of perennial liberal blind spots. 
Liberalism tends to ignore the historically contingent, power-political aspects in the 
institutional shaping of international orders, the spread of democracy, and the workings of 
free markets.  Instead, in the inter-war years as today, liberalism imbues these three 
fundamental elements of its world-view with universal, purely moral connotations, resulting 
in the kind of wishful thinking observed among the utopians of the 1920s and 1930s, and, as 
documented above, the liberals of post-Cold War Europe. 
Specifically, this essay pointed to three assumptions, dating from an era when 
liberalism was triumphant, that have to be abandoned in favour of a much more flexible 
approach, one fully acknowledging the role of power – in all its complex forms, including 
symbolic and structural – in international affairs: firstly, the supposition that an implicit 
regime centred on a ‘thick’ legal-institutional and normative framework, and supported by an 
ever-expanding NATO and EU can continue to be the lynchpin of pan-European security in 
spite of realities having moved on from the ‘End of History’;  secondly, the ‘end-of-history’ 
expectation that democracy’s inevitable spread would come to pacify the continent in the 
post-Cold War era; and thirdly, the presumption that processes integrating Russia into the 
global political economy would be seen in positive-sum terms in Moscow, as in the West. 
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Addressing this crisis of liberalism will also require a measure of introspection and 
reflection on the institutional aspects of Europe’s post-Cold War security arrangements. 
Indeed, the most directly relevant aspects of Carr’s critique appear to lie in its call to 
acknowledge the dangers in failing to discern the co-mingling of power and self-interest with 
political and economic normativity, and the denial of historical contingency in the creation of 
international order(s).  In that regard, Europe’s post-Cold War order was no different from 
the one confronting Carr in the 1920s and 1930s, when utopians also held onto outdated 
mechanisms because of a misguided belief in morally ordained ‘progress’ from which there 
could not be any retreat.  A Carrian realist perspective reveals the onwards march of both the 
European Union and NATO as a historically contingent product of post-Cold War power-
politics, rather than simply moral providence or rational inevitability, as claimed in the liberal 
canon.  In so doing, Carr’s realism calls for a sense of proportion and pragmatism when it 
comes to defending the post-Cold War European order as a value in-and-of-itself: a sense of 
proportion in acknowledging the role of Western hegemony – however enlightened – in its 
construction, and a pragmatism in taking into account the important role of changing 
balances of power between a self-interested West and Russia in shaping contemporary 
international society.   
Furthermore, the assumption that liberal democracy and democratisation will lead to 
more peaceful relations with ‘greater Europe’ – that is, Europe including the former Soviet 
Union – will have to be cast aside.  The more optimistic ‘transition’ models behind this idea 
have now been replaced by frameworks that consider the wide ‘grey zone’ between full 
totalitarianism and mature democracy as a more or less permanent (or at the very least very 
long-term) state of affairs. Both theoretically and empirically, the spread of democracy has 
proven far from inexorable.  Moreover, read in terms of symbolic power, democracy 
becomes part of subtle power-play between Moscow and the West. For all their moral 
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content, democracy and democratisation must also be seen as part of the power-political, 
rather than a denial thereof.  From that perspective, Western efforts at exporting democratic 
norms eastwards are inextricably linked to a Kantian – but nevertheless eminently 
geopolitical – grand project. Likewise, the Kremlin’s recent attempts to subvert democratic 
processes in a number of Western countries should be read as an insurgent, frustrated attempt 
to subvert an unattainable value read primarily in terms of its power-political implications.  
Finally, such a reformulation would entail the giving up of the liberal assumption that 
free-market and free-trade economics is always a positive-sum game to everyone, 
contributing to harmonious relations through the growing integration of, in this case, Russia, 
into the global economy.  Moscow has clearly been aware of its structurally disadvantaged 
position within the capitalist system, leading to a much greater sensitivity to the power-
political aspects of geo-economics, which it has also consistently perceived in zero-sum 
terms. For Moscow, natural resources are there to enhance the relative power of the state, 
both domestically and internationally.  The Kremlin’s attempts to counteract its disadvantage 
by coaxing its neighbours into integration projects through the crude application of hard 
power also emerge from this continued inequality.  Western attempts to formulate new 
approaches towards pan-European security should take account of these realities, if only 
because of the risks associated with denying the power-political where it clearly remains 
relevant. 
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